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For a long time, the central focus of anthropology 
has been on the study of the so-called traditional 
societies. However, with the transformation of 
those societies into "ethnicized" groups within state 
systems, anthropologists have had to rethink their 
concepts, theories, and methods. They have had 
to deal with, among others things, issues of cul­
tural difference, cultural boundaries, and cultural 
movements. This article looks retrospectively at 
certain changes that have taken place in anthro­
pology especially with regard to the study of eth­
nicity. 
Anthropology has not generally been considered, by out­
siders or by itself, as concerned centrally with ethnicity. As 
Evans-Pritchard, one of the deans of early anthropology, wrote: 
"While social anthropologists consider that their subject 
embraces all human cultures and societies, including our own, 
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they have ... for the most part given their attention to those of 
primitive peoples."i But, with the realization that there are no 
"primitive" peoples and with the transformation of supposedly 
isolated "traditional" societies into minorities within state sys­
tems, the discipline has not only found itself confronted with 
"ethnicized" groups but has been compelled to rethink its con­
cepts, theories, and methods in ways which are significant and 
instructive for ethnic studies. 
This opportunity to look retrospectively at anthropology 
traces the course of ethnographic and theoretical encounters 
with what would come to be called "ethnicity." The major con­
tributors to an "anthropology of ethnicity" are presented, even 
though they often did not see themselves as engaged in such 
an effort. Rather, as the field grappled with cultural difference, 
cultural boundaries, and cultural movements, it found itself 
inhabiting an "ethnic" landscape. As the qualities-and even 
the contents-of those cultures changed, anthropology neces­
sarily reflected back upon its own concepts and theories and 
engaged in a significant re-thinking, especially in regards to 
what exactly a "society" is, what its relation to "culture" is, and 
how we should represent it ethnographically. These issues 
should be and have been important for ethnic studies and 
speak to the convergence of the social sciences in this crucial 
domain. 
Romantic Nationalism and "Culture Circles" 
Before there were scholars of ethnicity or nationalism, 
there were ethnic and national phenomena, or better yet, eth­
nic or nationalist activists; then, as today, "the significance of 
the ethnic factor in many societies has been forced upon us 
more by events than by research." One of the first and most 
influential scholar-activists of what we could call "ethnic con­
sciousness" today is the German nationalist philosopher 
Johann Herder (1744-1803). Herder believed that the agent 
of human history is not the species as a whole nor the individ­
ual but an intermediate level, the national group or nationality. 
This is because each national group, he argued, is an "organ­
ic unit," a "national organism" with its own unique and natural 
qualities and genius, its own special culture and language, its 
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own national soul. Herder used such phrases as Nationalgeist, 
Seele des Vo/ks, Geist der Nation, and Geist des Vo/ks to cap­
ture this national peculiarity which was, to him, "inexpressible." 
Being that the "natural and the national were synonomous in 
Herder's mind"ii he perceived it as the ineffable yet rightful unit 
of mankind: "Every nationality is one people, having its own 
national culture as well as its language."iii 
Being a natural unit, "the group becomes a single 
being, an individuality, a personality," in which culture is the 
national personality, the group mind. The bearers of this cul­
ture, and even more so the authors or creators of this culture, 
the "individual prophets, writers, artists or poets are but the 
means employed by the national soul to give expression to a 
national religion, a national language, or a national literature."iv 
Being natural and distinct, national culture and the nation 
should be cultivated, unfettered by artificial rules and undis­
turbed by other foreign influences; to do otherwise would be to 
upset nature's plan and to interfere with the natural processes 
of human development. 
The relationship between early anthropology and the 
German philosophers like Herder (and Hegel and others) and 
ethnologists is a critical one for defining the concepts and the 
interests of the new field. German notions of Kultur and espe­
cially Kulturkreis are central in importance. Kultur, as Culture 
with a capital "c," is seen as one great world phenomenon, 
unfolding, developing, progressing in Hegelian fashion. In this 
way, all of the particular cultures of the world can be placed on 
the continuum of Culture. The German ethnologist Graebner 
and others interested in cultural history and evolution used the 
term Kulturkreis or "Culture circle" to refer to clusters of cultur­
al traits which existed at various places at various times and 
distinguished societies. The original culture circles were the 
goal of this study, and all of the world's cultures were to be 
classified in terms of their relation-their proximity or distance, 
geographically, temporally, and culturally-to the fundamental 
circles. The distribution of cultural traits thus became a central 
preoccupation of ethnology, along with the history of their diffu­
sion. E. B. Tylor states that the geographical distribution and 
the diffusion of cultural traits must be studied in the same man­
ner in which the botanist and the zoologist study plant and ani-
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mal species and their diffusion. It might even be argued that 
ethnology began as a kind of naturalist science, each "culture" 
or "society" viewed as a "species" distinguishable by a list of 
characteristics. 
The Critique of Race and Nationalism 
In a way, Franz Boas, perhaps the first professional 
modern anthropologist, both followed previous intellectual 
trends and set new ones. Furthermore, especially for our pur­
poses, he saw anthropology as a vital contributor to important 
issues of the day such as racism and nationalism. He suc­
cessfully and repeatedly deconstructed race as a concept, 
arguing that a race is not an objective or demonstrable descent 
group; there is as much physical variation within a race as 
between races; there are no "clear-cut geographical and bio­
logical lines between the races;"v and there is no correlation 
between race on the one hand and either mental or cultural 
characteristics on the other. 
In his sociocultural analyses, Boas asserted that every 
"tribe" or "primitive society" is a closed society; even so, he rec­
ognized that primitive societies are not actually socially and 
culturally isolated, that even "the simplest groups" have been 
affected and changed by contact with each other. Every cul­
ture, then, is, in his view, constructed as much by external fac­
tors and influences as by internal ones. He also understood 
that, while social and racial phenomena are two discrete levels 
of reality and analysis, the two may overlap-"social divisions 
[may] follow racial lines"vi - and when they do the racial dif­
ferences may be important for creating, preserving, and exac­
erbating social differences and inter-group conflict. 
Boas also writes about nationalism in an instructive 
way. For example, he distinguishes between nation and 
nationality, using "nation" basically the way we would use 
"state" today and "nationality" basically as we would use 
"nation"; a nationality for him is "a group of people alike in 
speech, culture, and in most cases representing no fundamen­
tal racial contrasts."vii Yet, although nationalities are usually 
racially homogeneous, he granted "only the slightest relation" 
between nationality and race; in fact, he found most racial 
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antipathies "fictitious" and actually derived from other sources 
than race, and in the final analysis he found both terms 
"vague." He saw no necessary equation between nations and 
nationalities. A nationality may inhabit two or more nations (he 
gives Italy before unification as an example), or two or more 
nationalities may inhabit the same nation (he gave 
Czechoslovakia and Poland as examples). 
What exactly constitutes a nation, then? This is prob­
lematic: objective characteristics like descent or unity of lan­
guage are not sufficient to make a solidary, identity-sharing 
group. Instead, it is something more subjective, more psycho­
logical or emotional-"the community of emotional life that aris­
es from our everyday habits, . . .  thoughts, feelings, and 
actions."viii Where that community feeling is lacking, even indi­
viduals who share descent and language may not share iden­
tity and may actually be in conflict. But where nation-bound­
aries and nationality-boundaries are not co-terminous, social 
frictions may arise, eventually taking the form of nationalist 
movements. 
Boas, interestingly, distinguished between two kinds of 
nationalism: the nationalism of nations and the nationalism of 
nationalities. Predictably, the nationalism of nations (what we 
might call "patriotism" today) attempts to unify the people of the 
nation regardless of the differences of constituent nationalities; 
it is integrative at the "state" or civil level. The nationalism of 
nationalities (modern "nationalism") strives to unify the people 
of the nationality regardless of nation (political) boundaries and 
is, therefore, disintegrative of actually-existing political organi­
zation and either separatist or "alternatively integrative" in the 
sense of positing a new political organization. Boas essential­
ly applauded the efforts of nations and nationalities to integrate 
at a higher level, expressing "full sympathy" with their desire to 
dismantle "the artificial barriers of small political units."ix. 
However, he does not approve of nationalism in the sense of 
separatism and particularism, that is, of creating smaller and 
less inclusive social groupings. For him, inclusiveness, ever 
higher levels of social integration, ultimately a "federation of 
nations," is not only desirable but inevitable. He sees such an 
inexorable march toward integration in history (notwithstanding 
moments of revolution and devolution) that he is absolutely 
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confident that this direction "will govern our history in the 
future" until its ultimate "consummation."x 
The Ethnography of a Changing Africa 
It was considered by early professional anthropologists 
"to be an advantage to be able to study those societies which 
are structurally so simple, and culturally so homogeneous, that 
they can be directly observed as wholes, before attempting to 
study complex civilized societies where this is not possible."xi 
Thus, for theoretical and political (i.e. colonialism) reasons, 
much of early anthropology's (especially British social anthro­
pology's) attention was turned to Africa. However, even "func­
tionalists" like Malinowski questioned this homogeneity and 
readily admitted the realities of cultural diversity, contact, and 
change. Often enough, what anthropology has to study is not 
the "'uncontaminated' Native" nor the "well-defined, circum­
scribed entity" called "a society" or "a culture" of anthropologi­
cal (and popular) imagination but a tumultuous social land­
scape in which each member and each society is part of a 
large, interconnected, constantly-changing whole which 
includes not only neighboring "natives" but Western societies 
and their agents and institutions as well. Therefore, even fifty 
years ago or more, he could maintain that "the scientific anthro­
pologist must be the anthropologist of the changing Native. 
Why? Because what exists nowadays is not a primitive culture 
in isolation but one in contact and process of change."xii 
Malinowski referred to nationalism as one of the "new 
and unexpected forces and factors" on the contemporary cul­
tural scene. But two opinions are manifest in his investigation 
of non-Western (largely African) nationalism: that this national­
ism is not a purely "native" phenomenon" and that it is not a 
purely "traditional" phenomenon. First, he perceived the role of 
Western culture, particularly but not exclusively in the form of 
colonialism and colonial administration, in the evolution or 
development of native nationalism. In cultural change, whether 
nationalism or some other type, there are generally "two cul­
tures to deal with instead of one." New cultural phenomena and 
movements are a product of both cultural sources, but they are 
not a simple combination of the two old sources; rather, they 
6 
Eller-Anthropology 
are "entirely new products" born of the impact and hybridization 
of the two cultures, and the resultant phenomena have "no 
antecedents in Europe or in African tribalism." The nature, 
quality, and direction of a development such as native nation­
alism "is determined by factors and circumstances which can­
not be assessed by the study of either culture alone .. . .  The 
clash and interplay of the two cultures produce new things."xiii 
Thus, nationalism, or we might add ethnicity, is certain­
ly not a simple continuation of traditional culture into the mod­
ern political world. It is rather an emergent and original social 
phenomenon in itself. Even if it takes the form of revivalism or 
irredentism or millenialism or what have you-even if it refers 
to or invokes tradition or culture or history-it is not "tradition" 
but some new treatment of and perspective on tradition. Such 
nationalism or ethnicity is precisely "retrospective" in the sense 
that it is not tradition but a memory of or a look back at a cul­
ture and custom which once was-or maybe never was. The 
former "tribalism" and the contemporary "nationalism" are any­
thing but identical for Malinowski: tribalism is un-self-con­
scious, while the new nationalism is sophisticated and self-con­
scious, reaching for "elements of the old culture . . .  with a sec­
ondary, almost ethnographic interest in racial history, custom­
ary law, and the artistic and intellectual achievements of their 
race."xiv The old tribalism is already dead, and what is afoot at 
present is not a memory but an invention. 
Accordingly, the objective establishment by anthropo­
logical means of the "true culture" or the "true past" of a socie­
ty is in the end less important, not only in itself but for under­
standing contemporary activities, than the study of what is 
going on presently and how that culture and past is being 
employed and deployed in the present. In true functionalist 
fashion, he argued that what anthropologists are often eager 
to collect (that is, what the "old men of the tribe" have to tell us 
about the past, the "authentic culture," etc.) is less than useless 
as science, as scientific investigation of the past, since it is 
memory, "affected by sentiment, by retrospective regrets, and 
longings." However, in a particularly insightful moment, 
Malinowski suggested that this is not only all right but impor­
tant-important for understanding not the past but the 
present-since for the modern anthropologist studying cultural 
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change, "what really matters is not the objectively true past, 
scientifically reconstructed and all-important to the antiquarian, 
but the psychological reality of today."xv Therefore, he allows 
us to see that native nationalism, even in its early manifesta­
tions, is not "traditional culture at work" but "traditional culture 
remembered," and that the "retrospective vision" upon which it 
is based is subjective and, ultimately, creative. 
Fortes and Evans-Pritchard provide an analysis of sev­
eral specific "traditional" African societies and find that they are 
neither so traditional nor always "societies" in the strictest 
sense. They describe, for example, that supposedly homoge­
neous African societies actually exhibit a striking amount of 
heterogeneity. In the introduction, they state that groups such 
as the Zulu, Ngwato, Bemba, Banyankole, and Kede "appear 
to be an amalgam of different peoples, each aware of its 
unique origin and history, and all except the Zulu and Bamba 
are still to-day [sic] culturally heterogeneous."xvi The contribu­
tions which make up the book support this general contention, 
adding that the groups themselves and the territories they 
occupy are often fairly recent developments. The Zulu, for one, 
were only constituted as a "nation" when the defeated peoples 
of the great leader Shaka were organized into a single political­
cultural complex; within the "nation" "old tribal loyalties and 
oppositions are still at work and faction fights frequently 
occur."xvii Schapera describes how the Ngwato "tribe" is a con­
geries of people, with about 20% actually belonging to the 
"nuclear community" of Ngwato (and even they were aggregat­
ed only in the eighteenth century after a schism from the 
Kwena group) and the rest coming from diverse populations 
"who became subject to the Ngwato chiefs at various times 
through conquest in war, voluntary submission, flight from an 
invading enemy, or secession from some other tribe."xviii 
Richards reports that many of the "traditional societies" of 
Africa have occupied their territory for less than two hundred 
years and many for as little as fifty to one hundred. 
Finally, Gluckman argues that not only is diversity with­
in "traditional societies" ordinary and tolerable but that conflict 
is also ordinary and may even be integrative. Societies, even 
small traditional societies, are "always elaborately divided . . .  by 
customary allegiances" which cross-cut and sometimes con-
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tradict and come into conflict with each other. The central point 
of his book is to show "how men quarrel in terms of certain of 
their customary allegiances, but are restrained from violence 
through other conflict ing allegiances which are also enjoined 
on them by custom. "xix Thus, it becomes possible to think of 
societies as internally diverse and segmented while sti ll inte­
grated; at the same t ime, it becomes clear that societ ies may 
not be as integrated as ethnic or national ideology and action 
stipulate or require. Finally, the crucial lesson for us in regard 
to modern ethnicity and ethnic conflict, as Gluckman's analy­
sis shows, lies in the cross-cutting allegiances which "tend to 
inhibit the development of open quarrelling" and worse in the 
totalizing, and thus segregating, ideology. In contemporary 
ethnicity, some or all of these cross-cutting and therefore uni ­
fying institutions or customs are lost or denied. The totalizat ion 
of "culture" and of the claims based on culture let slip the 
restraints which bind groups in civil, if hosti le, relations and cre­
ate conditions for uninhibited and total confrontat ion and con­
flict. 
Plural Societies and Fluid Boundaries 
The great early ethnographers tended to represent tra­
dit ional societ ies as discrete units in general isolation from 
other groups and from outside influences, especially Western 
influence (even when, as we have seen, thei r own commentary 
contradicted this image). Two works in the 1 950s began to 
challenge that view, both theoretically and ethnographically. 
One of these is Furnivall's Colonial Policy and Practice xx which 
is noteworthy for i ts acknowledgment of the inextricable link 
between traditional-societies-as-found and colonial and other 
outside factors and for the elaboration of the concept of "plural 
society." The book offers two consequential insights: that colo­
nial societies (particularly Burma and Netherlands India or 
Java) are heterogeneous and that nationalism in the two soci­
eties is  a result of colonialism. Burma, for example, is not one 
society but many; Burmese (or Burmans, as a "national" or 
"ethnic" category) are one of numerous peoples (which he calls 
"races") in the territory including Shan, Mon, Karen, Kachin, 
etc. "Burmese society" as a modern social system also con-
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tains other important groups, the exclusion of which from 
analysis would illicitly simplify or even falsify the picture. These 
other groups include Indians, Chinese, and of course 
Europeans. Not only was this society heterogeneous, but it 
was also "enclaved,"  with Indians, Chinese, Europeans, and 
"Burmese" all filling different "niches" in the social system (with 
the Chinese and Indians monopolizing t.he "middleman" posi­
tions of finance and trade between Europeans and the gener­
al population). These groups formed what we would only call 
today "ethnic groups" and differed considerably in their inter­
ests. These differences resulted in communal violence in 1 924 
and 1 93 1 . 
In Burma he sees nationalism at its earliest in the area 
of religion, on the part of Buddhist monks who organized reli­
gious revivalist movements and institutions such as the Young 
Men's Buddhist Association. Nationalism at this stage took the 
form of interest in the past culture of Burma-or one of the 
past cultures of Burma. By 1 92 1 , though, he reports that 
nationalism had passed from religious to political expression, 
and the new General Council of Buddhist Associations set its 
goal as home rule or even complete separation from England. 
The divergent interests of the constituent communities, cou­
pled with the low mobilization of the masses, made concerted 
action difficult. There was, in effect, no "Burmese nation" from 
which a movement could arise and for which it could speak. 
The consequences of self-government have been profound. 
As a first step, a Burma Government was established under 
the British Parliament in 1 937 but showed a number of weak­
nesses. For one thing, the legislature had authority only over 
Burmese people and not others in areas traditionally and 
administratively associated with Burma, such as Karenni, the 
Kachin H ills, or the Shan states. For another, the legislative 
seats were allotted on two different principles, territory and 
community. Just under a third of the seats (40 out of 1 32) in 
the House of Representatives were reserved for communal or 
other special interests, 37 of those 40 for Karens, Indians, 
Chinese, and naturally Europeans. Thus, representative gov­
ernment actually did not help integrate the society but rather 
set the stage for the activation, aggravation, and escalation of 
"sectional friction"(487). Placing groups in a position to com-
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pete for political power as groups threatened to elevate cultur­
al and economic differences into political and "nationalistic" 
level. 
The other element in Furnivall's analysis, and by far the 
more enduring one, is his concept of the plural society. 
Politically, a plural society "comprises separate racial sections" 
(or again, we might prefer "ethnic" over "racial," although in the 
case of Burma the differences are more than just cultural). 
There is a mix of different groups, each with its own culture, 
language, religion, etc., but more crucial than their co-presence 
is their social segregation: "they mix but do not combine"(304). 
They live side-by-side as citizens of the same polity but do not 
form a society in any significant way ; they constitute a sort of 
caste system without the religious integration of the real thing. 
This is why Furnivall rejects the characterization of the U.S. 
and Canada as plural societies: they have "plural features" 
(that is, a diversity of cultures and races sharing political and 
economic space), but they also have at least some measure or 
ideology of integration and equality. 
An even more influential early ethnography for the pur­
pose of elucidating ethnicity and the relation between ethnic 
groups and culture also took place in Burma. Leach's Political 
Systems of Highland Burma xxi was the first serious and suc­
cessful challenge to the standard approach of anthropology 
toward "society" and "social boundaries" up to that time. 
Encountering an extremely diverse and tangled cultural situa­
tion in the area of fieldwork, the Kach in Hills Area, he found that 
it was impossible to maintain simple and consistent distinctions 
or boundaries between the "social groups." 
The two main social categories in the region are Shan 
and Kachin. Shan are Buddhist, wet-rice cultivators, and 
organized into hierarchical "castes" with a hereditary nobility. 
Kachin, on the other hand, are an assortment of "hill peoples" 
with significant differences in language, territory, and politics 
from each other. Thus, here began Leach's problem. First, 
there was no systematic relation between the linguistic, the ter­
ritorial, and the political aspects of Kachin groups; it was diffi­
cult to determine where one group ends and the next begins, 
or even whether they are "different groups" at all. Second, 
transfer of population, individually and collectively, is possible 
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between Kachin and Shan categories; Shan society has been 
assimilating Kachins for at least a century (and probably much 
longer), such that "nearly all low class Shans are probably 
either of slave or commoner Kachin origin"(222) . And the over­
all oscillation between political structures which he found with­
in Kachin societies was also a result of association with and 
imitation of Shan politics: Kachin chiefs took Shan princes as 
their role-models and attempt to emulate their powers and pre­
rogatives. 
From these observations Leach asked the question 
which naturally occurs to us today but which he was perhaps 
the first one to perceive: When can we say that two groups are 
"two different societies" or merely "two segments of the same 
society"? The failure to tackle or even recognize this problem 
anthropologically up to this point, he argues, is in the very 
anthropological concepts of "society" and "culture"; in such 
complex and enmeshed social contexts as highlands Burma, 
"ordinary ethnographic conventions . . .  are hopelessly inappro­
priate"(28 1  ). In fact, he maintains that the differentiation of 
Shan and Kachin as distinct "societies" was an invention of 
British colonial administration in Burma, which imported 
Western notions of discrete social units and even more so of 
race. The entire population was classified for administrative 
purposes by race-race, he finds, "being a synonym for lan­
guage .. . .  The Kachins were deemed to be a 'race' therefore 
they must possess a special language"{43) . Further, the British 
tried to draw clear territorial boundaries between the "Shan" 
and "Kachin" "societies." Where language/dialect and territory 
coincided, especially if some order of kinship relation could be 
established for the "enclosed" group, a "tribe" was inferred. 
Leach's answer to this situation is to reconceive the 
units of analysis in anthropology and the reasons for cultural 
variation. "Tribe" is, at least in many cases, an "academic fic­
tion": "the ethnographer has often only managed to discern the 
existence of 'a tribe' because he took it as axiomatic that this 
kind of cultural entity must exist" (29 1  ) .  Rather, he suggests a 
unit of analysis appropriate to the ethnographic context, which 
in the present case would be the entire Kachin Hills Area with 
its many cultures, languages, and named collectivities. Such 
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collectivit ies would not be considered "social isolates" but ele­
ments in a larger and more inclusive social system. Second, 
the collectivities which comprise the system, and indeed the 
system itself, should be seen to have no stability through time: 
individuals flow from one political system to another; entire vil­
lages or groups undergo structural transformation from one 
political system to another, and the very form of the over-arch­
ing system may change as time proceeds. The traditional 
anthropological notion of equilibrium in society is rejected by 
Leach. 
Thus, in the end, Leach concludes that cultural cate­
gories and cultural identities are not really objective, tangible 
things but subjective, symbolic things; the identity or bound­
ary of a social collectivity "is not necessarily ascertainable in 
the realm of empirical facts; it is a question, in part at any 
rate, of the attitudes and ideas of particular individuals at a 
particular time"(288). In reconceiving "culture" and "society" 
as so open, fluid, even invented, the relationship between the 
two becomes for us analysts and ethnographers much more 
problematic, various, and unique to each case. 
Primordialism: Natural Bonds to Cultural Givens 
Within a decade, Old Societies and New States,xx ii 
appeared and shaped subsequent discourse, not only within 
anthropology but within ethnic studies. A number of authors 
contributed to this volume, but by far the most influential chap­
ter is the one written by Geertz himself, "The Integrative 
Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New 
States." The book grows out of and adds to the increasing 
awareness among anthropologists of the cultural conse­
quences and problems of the "new states" formed as a result 
of decolonization; while this topic is compelling enough in itself, 
it also has implications for the typical "objects" of the discipline, 
the "traditional," small-scale social isolate called a "society" or 
"culture." With the new "nation-building," the so-called "integra­
tive revolution," these social units are no longer isolated and 
self-contained but become part of larger, more inclusive social 
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systems. Anthropology's method and concepts would have to 
adjust accordingly as the objects of study themselves or per­
haps even disappear. 
Geertz, following Edward Shils, sees the problem of the 
new states as stemming from the "primordial" diversity of the 
enclosed societies within the states, which resists or at least 
complicates the creation of a state-wide society or "civil order." 
In a word, "the new states are abnormally susceptible to seri­
ous disaffection based on primordial attachments"(259). He 
goes on to explain his notion of "primordial" and "primordial 
attachment" in one of the most oft-quoted passages in all of 
anthropology or ethnic studies: 
By primordial attachment is meant one that stems from 
the "givens"-or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably 
involved in such matters, the assumed "givens"-of social exis­
tence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly but 
beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a 
particular religious community, speaking a particular language, 
or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social 
practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so 
on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, 
coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to one's 
kinsmen, one's neighbor, one's fellow believer, ipso facto, as 
the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, 
common interest, or incurred obligation but at least in great 
part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed 
to the very tie itself (259-60). 
The political problem, as he sees it, is that this primor­
dial particularism-"tribalism, parochialism, communalism, 
and so on"-threatens civil order and state integration in a 
more aggressive and insatiable way than other forms of 
social identity or discontent. "Economic or class or intellectu­
al d isaffection threatens revolution," but primordial disaffection 
threatens the boundaries if not the very existence of the state; 
it rejects outright the whole idea and fact of the state and its 
disembodied civil order outright. For this reason primordial 
sentiments have "a more ominous and deeply threatening 
quality than most of the other . . .  problems the new states 
face"(26 1  ). 
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Circumstantialism: Ethnic Boundaries, Not Ethnic 
Contents 
There were always those in anthropology and else­
where, like the Marxists, who rejected the primordial argument 
and favored a constructionist or "circumstantialist" approach. 
The seminal book within anthropology for this position was 
Ethnic Groups and Boundariesxxii i by Barth and his contribu­
tors. Like Leach before them, they find that cultural variation 
and social/ethnic boundaries are not co-terminous: groups with 
qualitative cultural differences are often subsumed under the 
same social/ethnic label and identity by outsiders or even by 
members, while groups with no major cultural differences are 
often distinguished into two or more social/ethnic categories. 
Consequently, "although ethnic categories take cultural differ­
ences into account, we can assume no simple one-to-one cor­
respondence between ethnic units and cultural similarities and 
differences"(1 4). Failing to find any sure understanding of eth­
nicity through a description of the content of a culture, Barth 
directs our attention instead to the relations between groups 
and the ways culture is used to generate and preserve those 
relations. 
The two central notions of this approach are ethnic 
boundary and social interaction. Ethnic groups are categories 
or categorial distinctions, socially bounded groups as deter­
mined by the social conditions in which two or more groups live 
and interact (even if that interaction takes the form of no inter­
action, as in total communal segregation). Ethnic groups are 
thus understood "as a form of social organization," a particular 
species of social categorization which "classifies a person in 
terms of his basic, most general identity, presumptively deter­
mined by his origin and background"(1 3). One of the curious 
and problematic things which he and his colleagues, and many 
other anthropologists, have noticed, though, is that social iden­
tity is not entirely ascribed, that people can in fact change their 
identity and their social/ethnic affiliation in many cases 
(although not always or in any way). In the book under discus­
sion, fur farmers in Africa, for example, can become Baggara 
pastoralists. What is interesting to Barth and the rest is that, 
although personnel may flow from one category or group to 
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another, the boundaries of the categories or groups persist . In 
fact, in this view, the continuity of ethnic groups depends nei­
ther on biological nor cultural continuity; individuals may come 
and go, and cultural traits may come and go. On the contrary, 
the "continuity of ethnic groups . . .  depends on the maintenance 
of a boundary. The cultural features that signal the boundary 
may change, and the cultural characteristics of the members 
may likewise be transformed; indeed; even the organizational 
form of the group may change, yet the fact of continuing 
dichotomization between member and outsiders" can remain 
( 1 4). Simply stated, it is "the ethnic boundary that defines the 
group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses"( 1 5) . 
The ethnic-boundary approach allows-or forces-us 
to consider how ethnic distinctions emerge. Barth proposes 
that there is no obvious or a priori way in which ethnic groups 
are formed or in which culture is deployed in the formation; 
indeed, only circumstances will determine which cultural traits 
"are used ... as signals and emblems of difference," which "are 
ignored," and which "are played down or denied"(p. 1 4) .  Any 
number of elements-"tribe, caste, language group, region or 
state," to which we might add religion, history, race, custom, 
and others-are perfectly adequate and useful as ethnic "dia­
critica." Additional consequences to mention in this diminution 
of the role of cultural difference in ethnic identities would be 
that the loss of difference between groups, assimilation in the 
purest sense, would not necessarily lead to a reduction in the 
personal salience or the "organizational relevance" of ethnic 
identity and that a great knowledge of culture, in particular of 
the history of culture-of culture in the past, of "tradition"­
would not necessarily lead us to a greater knowledge or under­
standing of the ethnic group. 
Constructing Culture and Reth inking Anthropology 
Barth's and other studies emphasize creativity and adaptability 
over tradition and the "survival" of primordial factors. In partic­
ular, changes in the subject-matter of anthropological inquiry 
(ostensibly, "primitive" or "traditional" societies) began to raise 
epistemological concerns within anthropology itself. These 
changes include the emergence of new social groups, "super-
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tribafization" or the formation of larger social units through 
amalgamation or absorption of smaller ones, culture-based 
(i.e. indigenous rights or irredentist) social movements, cultur­
al revivals, etc., state-building processes and cultural resist­
ance to these processes (including nationalist and separatist 
movements and ethnic wars), "tribally" organized resistance to 
development projects such as the Kayapo anti-dam activities in 
Brazil, and the "nativization" or rejection of post-colonial 
Western culture and/or the reclamation of (sometimes defunct) 
traditional cultural features. We might also mention the entry 
of "tribal peoples" into professional and political positions, with 
advances in their education which gave them access to 
anthropological writings. Altogether, these factors raised the 
unavoidable issue of inter-society contact and extra-society 
connections, rendering the concept of isolated and static soci­
eties utterly obsolete. They helped precipitate an epistemo­
logical crisis in anthropology : who exactly is the Other? How 
can we describe them in ethnographic terms? How can our 
methodologies cope with the interconnected complexity of the 
emerging social order? In the end, is knowledge of other cul­
tures possible, and if so, what responsibilities and guilts do we 
bear as members (and representatives) of dominant, formerly 
colonial societies? 
Among the first to respond was Hymes, with three 
issues of importance to ethnicity. The first of these revolves 
around the concept of culture as "traditional" versus "emer­
gent." If the objects of study are changing, then the study too 
must change: anthropology should, Hymes states, redefine 
itself from the study of primitive or small-scale societies to "the 
study of the emergence of cultural forms in concrete settings 
and in relation to a world society."xxiv The second issue con­
cerns the role of anthropology in particular and of Western 
society in general in the political, that is exploitative, relations 
between "our" society and "the Others. " William Willis , one of 
the contributors, defines anthropology as, to a large extent, 
"the social science that studies dominated colored peoples­
and their ancestors-living outside the boundaries of modern 
white society."xxv Therefore, anthropology has been anything 
but a pure scientific endeavor; even the concepts and theories 
of anthropology he sees as having political ramifications: ideas 
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of primitive society, of isolated society, of functionalism, of 
ethnographic voice at work to "absolve white people of their 
crimes" against colored societies, to "facilitate the imperial pol­
icy of divide and rule," and to "preclude the discovery of socio­
cultural links wider than tribal allegiances."xxvi 
The third issue from Hymes' book is the specifically 
epistemological one-whether our ethnographic descriptions 
are objective accounts of other cultures. Berreman quotes 
Zaretsky's criticism of the positivist ethnographic tradition "that 
the truth is there and that it is objectively discoverable, if only 
we experts look hard enough; if only we find the right mod­
els."xxvii Scholte takes a clear stand in asserting that anthro­
pology "is never only scientific" and that, "as cultural products 
and processes" themselves, anthropology's concepts, meth­
ods, and "knowledge" are bounded by the culture and interests 
of anthropologists, making anthropology itself an appropriate 
object of investigation to anthropology. 
Wagner takes this analysis one step further, consider­
ing how anthropology actually invents culture, in two senses: 
as the general idea of culture and as the particular individual 
social units or cultures to be described. This invention consists 
of the assumption and then the construction of "a concrete enti­
ty, a 'thing' that has rules, 'works' in a certain way, and can be 
learned"xxviii; that is, as the anthropologist tries to account for, 
understand, and represent the behavior of others, he/she cre­
ates a cultural "object' out of the data and experience. 
Anthropology, in this interpretation, is "the study of man 'as if' 
there were culture"(1 0). "The study of culture is in fact our cul­
ture" ( 1 6). He even likens anthropology to a culture-cult. 
Having allowed this kind of creativity to anthropologists, 
he says, we cannot deny the same kind and import of creativi­
ty to the culture itself and its members. He goes so far as to 
suggest that invention is culture. The implication of this per­
spective is that all people-anthropologists and natives, "mod­
ern" or "traditional"-are creatively assembling and advancing 
their behavior, the reasons for their behavior, and the circum­
stances (or interpretations of circumstances) of their behavior 
continuously, especially under conditions of social ambiguity or 
novelty which provide a kind of culture shock; people control 
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and make sense of their experience "through all kinds of imag­
ined and constructed 'rules,' traditions, and facts" (35). 
Since then others have continued to develop and build 
upon these insights with important consequences both for 
anthropology and for ethnicity studies. Hobsbawm and Ranger, 
for instance, present data to show that many phenomena 
which we call traditional are in actuality relatively new, that 
behaviors or symbols "which appear or claim to be old are 
often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented."xxix Such 
"invented traditions" refer to the past and avow a continuity with 
the past, but this continuity is "largely factitious," serving an 
ideological function as "a legitimator of action and cement of 
group cohesion." The invocation of the past, the establishment 
of a link to the past, gives ethnic groups and nations what they 
need most-an apparent continuity and naturalness or primor­
diality. In fact, they assert, as others have, that "tradition" of 
this sort is evidence of a distinct and decisive break with the 
past, a new self-consciousness, reflexitivity, and problemati­
cization of culture and identity which would be odd if not impos­
sible in the "traditional" setting to which invented traditions 
refer: after all, "when the old ways are alive, traditions need be 
neither revived nor invented"(8). 
Anderson goes even further to consider nations as 
"imagined communities" in which the members "will never 
know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear 
of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their com­
munion."xxx The crucial features of this image of nation are its 
boundedness, its sovereignty, and its community (that although 
there are social differences and inequalities-vertical differ­
ences-within the nation yet the nation shares a "deep, hori­
zontal comradeship"). In particular, the development and diffu­
sion of printing and vernacular print-languages created "unified 
fields of exchange and communications" giving rise simultane­
ously to a culture, an audience for that culture, and the mental 
image of that audience as a community to its far-flung mem­
bers. In print but not only in print, for also in other mass media 
like radio and television, as well as in political activity (the for­
mation of parties, the giving of speeches, the casting of votes, 
etc.) and many other practical behaviors, a disparate group can 
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come to recognize or believe in commonalities with each other, 
whether or not those commonalities are old or even real. 
Kuper picks up one thread of this argument to show 
that a particular kind of culture, or a particular conception of 
culture, is invented, that is, "primitive" culture. He demon­
strates, through a consideration of the early history of anthro­
pology, how the idea of primitive society was "a fantasy which 
had been constructed by speculative lawyers in the late nine­
teenth century"xxxi such as Bachofen, Maine, McLennan, and 
Morgan (8). Indeed, the "idea of primitive society fed the com­
mon belief that societies were based either on blood or on soil 
and that these principles of descent and territoriality may be 
equated with race and citizenship, the contrasting components 
of every imperialism and every nationalism"(9). Yet, even as he 
says this he perceives that anthropology is changing-perhaps 
again, reinventing itself. " It is no longer about the primitive, and 
no longer particularly or necessarily about 'the Other"' (243). 
In fact, the object of anthropological inquiry is often 
these days anthropology itself. This is most forcefully posited 
in Clifford and Marcus. In Clifford's introduction, he asserts 
that ethnography, the central activity of knowing and describing 
culture in anthropology, "is always caught up in the invention, 
not the representation, of culture."xxxii Our knowledge of other 
cultures is not entirely scientific or "objective" becau_se it is par­
tial and perspectival, constructed in the encounter between 
anthropologist and member, and conditioned by all sorts of 
anthropological customs and conventions. In fact, such knowl­
edge could not be scientific or objective since cultures "are not 
scientific 'objects' .. . [but] are produced historically, and are 
actively contested" ( 1 8). In particular, the notion of anthropolog­
ical literature is taken very seriously, alluding to all of the liter­
ary devices and tropes that ethnographers employ to represent 
the knowledge or experience they gain in the field and to pres­
ent that knowledge and experience, from narrative voice to 
scene-sett ing techniques to the d issolution of the invest igator 
into the "objective" account of the culture. Description is impli­
cated with representation (choices about how to make the cul­
ture-as-learned-by-the-ethnographer at once clear, convincing, 
compelling, and relevant) as well as interpretation and, in the 
end, invention by both researcher and informant ; the informant 
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"invents" answers to specific questions, and the researcher 
"invents" a coherent monograph and therefore "culture" out of 
the answers. Thus, Clifford identifies what he calls the "cultur­
al poesis" which is located in the "specific exclusions, conven­
tions, and discursive practices" of ethnography. 
The consequences for ethnicity of the poetic and politi­
cal invention of culture should be obvious. Fischer, explicitly 
states that ethnicity, like all other facets of culture, "is some­
thing reinvented and reinterpreted in each generation by each 
individual,"xxxiii even if it may seem natural, incomprehensible, 
or individual him/herself. As an invention it can never be mere 
or pure tradition but is a contemporary product of "a process of 
inter-reference between two or more cultural traditions," partic­
ularly the "ethnic" culture and the modern plural culture in 
which it is currently situated and for which it is currently pre­
pared. Therefore, as we have seen repeatedly, ethnicity may 
evoke a past to which it is connected-and it may even actual­
ly be connected to that past-but the real point of ethnicity, 
Fischer writes, is to create new values, a new vision of mean­
ing and "the good," "an ethic workable for the future." 
Conclusion: The Message of Culture-and the Messenger 
The anthropologist is a messenger, yet he or she is a 
not mere and objective messenger: when one finds a message 
(the "culture" or may even more so the "meaning" of the cul­
ture) "he appropriates it, translates it, and makes it 'relevant' to 
those to whom he delivers it."xxxiv In a certain sense, anthropol­
ogy creates or styles its message and meaning out of its 
encounter with particular people and social situations. The 
anthropologist does not, in the end, merely discover a society 
or culture nor "translate" cultural "texts" "the way the translator 
does. He must first produce them"(43). 
The implicatio.n for ethnicity in simply this: if, upon 
reflection, we can identify and attribute these facets and forces 
to the anthropological "version" of culture, we can hardly deny 
them to the "native's" or "member's" version. In other words, 
as members go about "doing" their culture they are also creat­
ing their culture, out of the same "complex play of desire and 
power" which is heightened and focused in the ethnographic 
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encounter. "Culture" and "history" exist as a kind of passive 
and plastic data which individuals, groups, and proto-groups 
and would-be groups can interpret, consciously or uncon­
sciously, and even manipulate in the service of their desire and 
power. Desire-to be a group, to be a superior group, to right 
perceived wrongs, to establish a culture-based society or poli­
ty, or what have you-can color the "facts" or "truths" of "cul­
ture" so thoroughly that the desire becomes the truth; in a more 
sinister manner, if an individual, party, or group desires to 
achieve power or status by way of culture, by invoking culture 
and calling upon others to heed the call, it is all too easily done. 
In the process, the messenger takes on a second role as mes­
sage-creator, although he or she may mystify this role by claim­
ing merely to "find" or "discover" or "recognize" or "represent" a 
true culture out there. At the same time, message receiver, the 
"group-out-there," which may not have been waiting for a mes­
sage, has its own desires, which may or may not coincide with 
those of the messenger-or may be made to coincide. 
In a sense, then, the ethnic leader or "ethnic entrepre­
neur''xxxv not only carries a cultural "truth" but invents one, 
especially when the ethnic group is not fully "self-aware" or 
"awake" until the leader and his truth appear. This is why we 
so often find competing leaders with competing messages 
about what the group is, which part of its culture or history is 
most critical to its identity and future, and what it should do 
next. Ethnic members, like anthropologists, are free to look for 
their message, to let their desire lead them toward certain mes­
sages, and to act upon the message which compels or serves 
them; different members will necessarily find and convey dif­
ferent messages from the same culture and history, and the 
"ethnicity" which ultimately emerges can only be understood as 
a consequence of "the complex play of desire and power" 
between the competing versions and their competing carriers. 
In conclusion, we have followed the development of the 
concept of ethnicity and ethnic group in anthropological theory 
and ethnography from that of a natural and primordial, almost 
physical and spiritual, phenomenon to a problematic and vari­
ably-bounded one to, ultimately, a constructed, political, poetic, 
and future-oriented one. We have seen that this development 
has been driven principally by changes in the phenomenon 
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itself-the rise of new groups, the demise of old groups, the 
shift of cultural foci of existing groups, and the emergence of 
political significance for ethnicity. Anthropology, as the science 
of culture, has helped problematize culture in a valuable way 
for ethnic studies. Simply put, ethnicity is not identical to cul­
ture or tradition, and ethnic groups are not necessarily distinct 
cultural groups. It has become clear that we cannot get at eth­
nicity merely by way of "cultural content, " of a list of cultural 
traits on which ethnic groups differ point by point. Groups in 
any common social system will share some traits and vary on 
others, and the ethnic lines do not always fall where the cultur­
al lines do-and neither lines are permanent. In fact, an objec­
tive list of cultural traits does not even exist in a certain sense 
but is constructed, invented, in social interaction, whether this 
interaction is the fieldwork encounter, the colonial encounter, or 
the contemporary ethnic members' experience in his or her plu­
ral society. While ethnicity and ethnic conflict are not mere or 
pure cultural opportunism, and invention (of groups or even of 
traits) is not completely without restraint, failure to recognize 
the contextual, circumstantial, fictive, and political qualities of 
ethnicity render it and its resultant manifestations much more 
opaque, irrational, and absolute than they really are. 
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